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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
C.H., as guardian ad litem of Z.H. and on her own behalf, 
appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing her 
complaint in this civil rights action. She alleges that the 
defendants, New Jersey public school authorities, 
impermissibly restricted Z.H.'s freedom of expression while 
he was a student in kindergarten and first grade. She also 
contends that the defendants' actions were so hostile 
toward religion as to violate the Establishment Clause. We 
will affirm. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Because we are reviewing the District Court's Rule 12(c) 
judgment on the pleadings, we view the facts and 
inferences to be drawn from the pleadings in a light most 
favorable to C.H., the non-moving party. Janney 
Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard Niles Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 
406 (3d Cir. 1993). The following facts are affirmatively 
alleged in the complaint. 
 
This case arises from two incidents that occurred while 
Z.H. was a student at the Haines Elementary School in 
Medford, New Jersey. The first incident occurred while Z.H. 
was a kindergarten student. In the spirit of the 
Thanksgiving holiday, Z.H.'s teacher asked the students to 
make posters depicting what they were "thankful for." Z.H. 
produced a poster indicating that he was thankful for 
Jesus. Initially, Z.H.'s poster was hung in the hallway 
outside the kindergarten classroom along with all of the 
other students' artistic works. Subsequently, on a day 
when Z.H.'s teacher was absent from school, certain 
unnamed employees of the Defendant Township of Medford 
Board of Education removed Z.H.'s poster because of its 
religious theme. When Z.H.'s teacher returned the next day, 
she placed the poster back on the hallway wall, but hung 
it in a less prominent location at the end of the hallway. 
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The second incident occurred approximately one and 
one-half years later while Z.H. was a student in defendant 
Grace Oliva's first grade class at Haines Elementary School. 
As a reward for special achievement in reading 
assignments, Ms. Oliva invited students to bring to class a 
book from home and read one of their favorite stories to the 
class. The only pre-announced condition to this privilege 
was that Ms. Oliva would review the stories proposed by the 
students to insure that their length and complexity were 
appropriate for first graders. Z.H. qualified for this honor 
and brought to school his favorite book, entitled"The 
Beginner's Bible: Timeless Children's Stories," which was a 
cartoon-illustrated collection of 95 children's stories based 
upon The Bible. Z.H. asked to read "A Big Family," a story 
based upon Genesis 29:1-33:20 that read, in its entirety, as 
follows: 
 
       Jacob traveled far away to his uncle's house. He 
       worked for his uncle taking care of sheep. While he 
       was there, Jacob got married. He had twelve sons. 
       Jacob's big family lived on his uncle's land for many 
       years. But Jacob wanted to go back home. One day, 
       Jacob packed up all his animals and his family and 
       everything he had. They traveled all the way back home 
       to where Esau lived. Now Jacob was afraid that Esau 
       might still be angry at him. So he sent presents to 
       Esau. He sent servants who said, "Please don't be 
       angry anymore." But Esau wasn't angry. He ran to 
       Jacob. He hugged and kissed him. He was happy to see 
       his brother again. 
 
After reviewing Z.H.'s selection, Ms. Oliva informed Z.H. 
that he could not read this story to the class "because of its 
religious content." Instead, Ms. Oliva permitted Z.H. to read 
the story to her outside the presence of the other students. 
Other students who brought in stories from non-religious 
sources were permitted to read their stories to the class. 
 
Upon learning of her son's experience, C.H. contacted 
several school officials. First, C.H. contacted Ms. Oliva who 
informed her that Z.H. could not read "the Bible" in class 
"because it might influence other students." Next, C.H. 
contacted defendant Gail Pratt, Principal of Haines 
Elementary School, who explained that Z.H.'s reading 
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selection "was the equivalent of praying and might upset 
Muslim, Hindu and Jewish students." Further, Pratt noted 
that there was "no place in the public school for the reading 
of the Bible" and that perhaps C.H. should consider 
removing Z.H. from public school. C.H. then contacted 
defendants Patrick Johnson, Superintendent of Schools, 
and the Medford Board of Education, demanding that Z.H. 
be allowed to read his story to the class and that the 
defendants apologize for their conduct. These defendants 
did not respond to this demand. 
 
For apparently unrelated reasons, Z.H.'s family 
subsequently moved from the Medford school district. At 
the time the complaint was filed, Z.H. was attending public 
school in another community also in Burlington County, 
New Jersey. 
 
C.H. filed a two-count complaint in the District Court, 
alleging that the defendants' actions violated Z.H.'s First 
Amendment right to freedom of expression. While her 
complaint did not allege that the defendants' actions 
violated the Establishment Clause, that claim was 
thereafter raised and the District Court's opinion addressed 
it. C.H. appeals the disposition of that claim, and we will 
consider it as well. Named as defendants were Oliva, Pratt, 
Johnson, the Medford School Board, Leo Klagholtz, New 
Jersey's Commissioner of Education, and the New Jersey 
Department of Education. In Count I, plaintiff sought 
monetary damages against the Medford defendants alleging 
that they intentionally, willfully or with reckless disregard, 
deprived Z.H. of his constitutionally protected right to 
freedom of expression in violation of 42 U.S.C.S 1983. In 
Count II, plaintiff alleged that the state defendants aided in 
the violation of Z.H.'s First Amendment rights, and sought 
an order requiring them to implement the policies 
necessary to protect from discrimination any student who 
presents religious views. 
 
The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The District Court granted 
defendants' motion and dismissed the complaint against all 
defendants.1 C.H. now appeals. We have jurisdiction under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court's opinion also addressed a number of the 
defendants' jurisdictional defenses. See C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. 341, 
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28 U.S.C. S 1291, and exercise plenary review over district 
court dismissals under Rule 12(c). Hayes v. Community 
Gen. Osteopathic Hosp., 940 F.2d 54, 56 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 
290 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
II. "A BIG FAMILY" 
 
A. 
 
While the parties dispute some details, they agree that (1) 
"A Big Family" was an appropriate response to the 
assignment given by Ms. Oliva to her first-grade class in the 
sense that it was a favorite story of Z.H.'s and was of 
appropriate length and reading complexity, and (2) Z.H. was 
permitted to read "A Big Family" only to his teacher and not 
to his classmates in class because it was a story based 
upon the Bible. Accordingly, the issue presented by the 
undisputed facts can be simply stated: whether public 
school students in the first grade have a First Amendment 
right to present religious material in class where that 
material is responsive to a teacher's assignment. 
 
Plaintiff correctly points out that state policies that 
restrict expression of religious perspectives are not 
viewpoint neutral even where those policies apply equally to 
all religious perspectives. While such policies do not 
discriminate against any particular religious faith, they do 
discriminate against non-secular perspectives. See 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 831 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches 
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-94 (1993). As a result, 
plaintiff insists such restrictions are precluded by the First 
Amendment where, as here, they are not narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling state interest. 
 
The defendants respond that, in the context of afirst- 
grade classroom, a teacher must be able to take cognizance 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
347-52 (D. N.J. 1996). In so doing, the District Court dismissed the 
State Department of Education as a defendant on Eleventh Amendment 
grounds and removed C.H. as a plaintiff in her personal capacity 
because she lacked standing. Id. at 348-49. 
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of the fact that state-compelled exposure of young children 
to religious material is a matter of great sensitivity among 
members of a school community. Defendants insist that 
students of this age are very impressionable and cannot be 
relied upon to distinguish between those things their 
teacher endorses and those things she merely allows to be 
expressed in her classroom. Accordingly, the defendants 
urge that the situation confronted by Ms. Oliva held a 
realistic and substantial risk of the school's being perceived 
by the students and their parents as endorsing the Bible 
before a captive and vulnerable audience. They conclude 
that teachers must be permitted to avoid subject matter 
holding this kind of potential for disruptive controversy. 
 
B. 
 
Although it is undisputed that public school students 
" `do not shed their constitutional rights . . . at the 
schoolhouse gate,' the nature of those rights is[determined 
by] what is appropriate for children in school." Veronica 
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995) 
(quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). "The State's power over school 
children . . . is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree 
of supervision and control that cannot be exercised over 
free adults." Id. at 655. Moreover, it is well accepted that 
public schools perform a critical role in shaping the 
nation's youth, and that federal courts should be wary of 
interfering in this process. As the Supreme Court observed 
more than thirty years ago: 
 
       Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of 
       conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school 
       systems and which do not directly and sharply 
       implicate basic constitutional values. 
 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). Over the 
years, the Court has repeatedly reemphasized this theme. 
E.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 
(1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 
266 (1988). 
 
With this foundation, we turn to the Supreme Court 
precedent most helpful in the current context, Hazelwood 
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Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In Hazelwood, 
the Supreme Court considered whether a public school's 
decision to excise two articles from the student paper 
violated the students' First Amendment rights. The 
newspaper, Spectrum, was written and edited by the high 
school's Journalism II class, under the direction of the 
teacher, and was published and printed with funds 
supplied by the high school. Prior to the final press run of 
the school year, the teacher reviewed the year'sfinal edition 
and objected to two stories that were scheduled to be 
included. One of the stories described the experiences of 
three of the school's students with pregnancy, the other 
discussed the impact of divorce on students at the school, 
and both were written in a manner that might have 
revealed the identity of at least some of the students and 
parents discussed. Because he believed there was 
insufficient time before the scheduled press run to modify 
the stories, the teacher elected to pull the stories from the 
press run with the approval of his superiors. 
 
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether 
Spectrum could appropriately be characterized as a public 
forum. The Court found that the school had never evinced 
an "intent to open the pages of Spectrum to `indiscriminate 
use' by its student[s]," and, on the contrary, had "reserve[d] 
the forum for its intended purpos[e] as a supervised 
learning experience for journalism students." Hazelwood, 
484 U.S. at 270 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). For these reasons, Spectrum was found to be a 
non-public forum. This meant that the school was entitled 
to exercise control over the content of the paper for 
purposes other than maintaining discipline and avoiding 
disruption of the learning process. 
 
The Hazelwood Court then explained that there was an 
important additional distinction between speech that may 
be perceived as promoted by a school and speech that a 
school is asked only to tolerate: 
 
        The question whether the First Amendment requires 
       a school to tolerate particular student speech . . . is 
       different from the question whether the First 
       Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote 
       particular student speech. The former question 
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       addresses educators' ability to silence a student's 
       personal expression that happens to occur on the 
       school premises. The latter question concerns 
       educators' authority over school-sponsored 
       publications, theatrical productions, and other 
       expressive activities that students, parents, and 
       members of the public might reasonably perceive to 
       bear the imprimatur of the school. These activities may 
       fairly be characterized as part of the school 
       curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional 
       classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by 
       faculty members and designed to impart particular 
       knowledge or skills to student participants and 
       audiences. 
 
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71. 
 
Hazelwood teaches that student expression that is a part 
of a school curriculum may be subject to greater 
restrictions than tolerated speech and articulates the 
relevant legal standard to be applied in cases involving 
such expression: 
 
       Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over 
       this . . . form of student expression to assure that 
       participants learn whatever lessons the activity is 
       designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not 
       exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their 
       level of maturity, and that the views of the individual 
       speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school. 
       . . . [E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by 
       exercising . . . control over the style and content of 
       student speech in school-sponsored expressive 
       activities so long as their actions are reasonably related 
       to legitimate pedagogical concerns.  
 
Id. at 271-73 (emphasis added). 
 
The Court gave the following examples of the kinds of 
restrictions that would be considered "reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns": 
 
       [A] school must be able to take into account the 
       emotional maturity of the intended audience in 
       determining whether to disseminate student speech on 
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       potentially sensitive topics, which might range from the 
       existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school 
       setting to the particulars of teenage sexual activity in a 
       high school setting. A school must also retain the 
       authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that 
       might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or 
       alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise 
       inconsistent with "the shared values of a civilized social 
       order," or to associate the school with any position 
       other than neutrality on matters of political 
       controversy. 
 
Id. at 272 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675, 683 (1986)). 
 
It is apparent from these examples that a viewpoint- 
based restriction on student speech in the classroom may 
be reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns 
and thus permissible. A rule foreclosing classroom speech 
that promotes the use of alcohol or that advocates a 
position on a controversial political issue is recognized by 
Hazelwood to be permissible even though it is not viewpoint 
neutral. 
 
After thus explicating the "legitimate pedagogical 
concerns" standard, the Hazelwood Court turned to the 
case before it and conducted a contextual analysis that 
took into account the sensitive nature of the subject matter 
of the excised articles and the ages of the intended 
audience, as well as the privacy interests of the students 
and parents that might have been identified. The ultimate 
conclusion was that the First Amendment rights of the 
student journalists had not been violated. In the course of 
reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the argument 
that school officials should be permitted to exercise 
prepublication control over school-sponsored student 
expression only pursuant to preestablished criteria. It 
believed that preestablished "regulations in the context of a 
curricular activity could unduly constrain the ability of 
educators to educate." Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.6 
 
Hazelwood clearly stands for the proposition that 
educators may impose non-viewpoint neutral restrictions 
on the content of student speech in school-sponsored 
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expressive activities so long as those restrictions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 
Contrary to plaintiff 's suggestion, this remains the law of 
the land. 
 
Plaintiff insists that under Lamb's Chapel v. Center 
Moriches Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 385 (1993), and Rosenberger 
v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), absent a compelling state 
interest, it is no longer permissible under any 
circumstances for a school to prohibit religious perspectives 
while permitting secular ones. Lamb's Chapel and 
Rosenberger are distinguishable from Hazelwood, however. 
The student speech at issue in both Rosenberger and 
Lamb's Chapel is more appropriately characterized as 
"tolerated," rather than "promoted," speech. Indeed, 
Rosenberger expressly distinguished and preserved 
Hazelwood on this ground. 
 
In Lamb's Chapel, a public school restricted speech by 
permitting numerous community organizations to access its 
facility for after-hours use, while denying a church 
organization access when it sought to use the facilities to 
show a film series on family and child-rearing issues from 
a Christian perspective. In Rosenberger, the University 
restricted student speech by refusing to grant funding from 
a student activities fund for extracurricular activities to a 
student-run publication with an explicitly Christian 
perspective, even though such funding was granted to other 
student organizations. In neither case did the expressive 
activity at issue "occur in a traditional classroom setting, 
. . . supervised by faculty members and designed to impart 
particular knowledge or skills to students," as in 
Hazelwood. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 570. Moreover, 
Rosenberger distinguished Hazelwood on the ground that 
the latter dealt with the State's ability to impose restrictions 
on the school's own speech, whereas Rosenberger 
addressed state restrictions on private, or tolerated, speech: 
 
       [W]hen the [State] determines the content of the 
       education it provides, it is the [State] speaking, and we 
       have permitted the government to regulate the content 
       of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker 
       . . . . It does not follow, however, . . . that viewpoint- 
       based restrictions are proper when the [State] does not 
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       itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it 
       favors . . . . A holding that the [State] may not 
       discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons 
       whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the[State's] 
       own speech, which is controlled by different principles. 
       See, e.g., Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools 
       (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990); 
       Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 
       270-72 (1988). 
 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833-34. 
 
Thus, the requirement of viewpoint neutrality, while 
essential to the analysis of a school's restrictions on extra- 
curricular speech, such as that at issue in Rosenberger and 
Lamb's Chapel, is simply not applicable to restrictions on 
the State's own speech. Under Hazelwood, "[e]ducators are 
entitled to exercise greater control over . . . student 
expression" when it is elicited as part of a teacher- 
supervised, school-sponsored activity. Hazelwood , 484 U.S. 
at 271. In that specific environment, viewpoint neutrality is 
neither necessary nor appropriate, as the school is there 
responsible for "determin[ing] the content of the education 
it provides." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This conclusion is not inconsistent with Chandler v. James, No. 97- 
6898, 1999 WL 493495 (11th Cir. July 13, 1999). In Chandler, the Court 
held that the students' First Amendment right to freedom of expression 
was violated where students were barred from engaging in purely 
student-initiated, unsupervised, religious expression at school, such as 
prayer or other devotional speech at school-related assemblies, sporting 
events, or graduation ceremonies. The Chandler Court focused on the 
fact that the student speech at issue was purely student-initiated, and 
found that "the speech is not the State's--either by attribution or by 
adoption." Id. at *6. Unlike Z.H.'s speech here, the student speech at 
issue in Chandler was clearly "tolerated" speech, triggering a higher 
level 
of scrutiny of the restrictions involved. Indeed, the Court's conclusion 
that the limitation was unconstitutional was expressly predicated on this 
fact, thereby distinguishing it from the case at bar. See id. at *10 ("So 
long as school personnel do not participate in or actively supervise 
student-initiated speech, [the County School Board] cannot 
constitutionally prohibit students from speaking religiously. . . ."). 
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C. 
 
We have no difficulty concluding that Ms. Oliva'sfirst- 
grade classroom was a non-public forum. There is no claim 
that the school invited the public, or any segment of the 
public, to use this forum for expressive activity. To the 
contrary, it was operated by the school exclusively for 
purposes of elementary education. While expressive activity 
was encouraged in this classroom, such expression was 
encouraged in the context of a "supervised learning 
experience." Id. at 270. In this respect, the forum at issue 
here is analogous to that in Hazelwood, in which a school- 
sponsored, student-run newspaper was held to be a 
nonpublic forum largely because the school retained control 
over the paper to ensure it was reserved "for its intended 
[educational] purpose." Id.; see also Muller v. Jefferson 
Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(elementary school classroom was a nonpublic forum); 
Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (same). 
 
We also have no difficulty concluding that Z.H.'s 
proposed story, like Spectrum, was a part of the school's 
curriculum and is appropriately characterized as promoted 
expression. It necessarily follows that the issue for decision 
is whether the decision to deny permission to read"A Big 
Family" to the class was reasonably related to a legitimate 
pedagogical concern. We conclude that it was. 
 
D. 
 
We note at the outset that the decision maker here was 
the classroom teacher, Ms. Oliva. She was vested with the 
authority, unconstrained by school regulations, to 
determine the manner in which the classes should be 
conducted so as to best serve the educational mission of 
the school. This required her to exercise her discretion in 
light of all the circumstances she confronted. Her exercise 
of this discretion is entitled to substantial deference from 
this Court not only because she is a professional educator, 
but also because she is in a far better position than we to 
predict how students and their parents are likely to 
respond to the way she conducts her class in any given 
situation and what impact those responses may have on 
the ongoing educational process. 
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Z.H. wanted to read a story from "The Beginner's Bible." 
If he were permitted to do so, it was reasonable to expect 
that other students might recognize that presentation as a 
story from the Bible. Even if Z.H. did not choose to 
expressly so inform his classmates, the title of the volume, 
the names of the characters and the clothing in which the 
characters were depicted in the illustrations could convey 
this message. To be sure, as plaintiff stresses, the content 
of the story was consistent with its being from a secular 
source. But the potential for Z.H.'s presentation being 
perceived by some of his classmates as a reading from the 
Bible clearly existed, and we believe a teacher in Ms. Oliva's 
position was entitled to take that fact into account. 
 
In determining whether Ms. Oliva's decision was 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns, the 
context is, of course, crucial. Ms. Oliva's was afirst-grade 
class. For children at this level, their teacher is a primary 
source of authority in their lives. They look to their teacher 
for signals of appropriate behavior. As a result, lessons that 
a first-grade teacher imparts to a class, or allows to be 
imparted in a classroom under her supervision, are likely to 
be understood as carrying her imprimatur. While older 
students may be able to distinguish messages a teacher 
specifically advocates from those she merely allows to be 
expressed in the classroom, most first graders cannot be 
counted on to make this nuanced distinction. 
 
We believe it was also an important part of the context of 
Ms. Oliva's decision that the classroom setting involved a 
religiously heterogeneous and captive audience. It is not 
unreasonable to expect that parents of non-Christian 
children would resent exposure of their six-year-old 
children to a reading from the Bible. Nor is it unreasonable 
to expect that some parents of Christian first graders would 
regard a compelled classroom exposure to material from the 
Bible as an infringement of their parental right to guide the 
religious development of their children at this stage. 
Moreover, it is not unreasonable to expect that any 
resentment engendered by Z.H.'s reading would have a 
significant adverse impact on the important relationship 
between the parents, the teacher, and their school. 
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It is most certainly true, as plaintiff emphasizes, that 
religion is an important part of the human experience and 
that no child's education can reasonably be regarded as 
complete without meaningful exposure to the variety of 
religious perspectives that he or she will encounter in the 
community and to the impact that religion has had in the 
development of civilization. For this reason, there are 
undoubtedly some contexts in which a school's foreclosure 
of student religious expression in a classroom will not be 
reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical concern. The 
pedagogical issue presented by this case, however, is one of 
timing. Our holding is a narrow one: a first-grade public- 
school teacher may reasonably conclude that the 
pedagogical detriment likely to flow from permitting what 
may be perceived as a reading of a Bible story in her 
classroom outweighs any pedagogical benefits. 
 
III. THE POSTER 
 
We now turn to the school's decision to temporarily 
remove Z.H.'s poster from the kindergarten arts display. 
Our analysis and conclusion parallel those of the preceding 
section. First, we conclude that the display area in the hall 
outside the kindergarten classroom, like the first-grade 
classroom, was a non-public forum. Nothing in the record 
suggests that it had been opened up to the display of any 
material not constituting, or generated in response to, the 
school's educational curriculum. Moreover, we also 
conclude that the art display, like the stories read in class, 
was "promoted" rather than "tolerated" speech. It follows 
that the issue to be resolved is whether the school's 
decision to temporarily remove Z.H.'s poster was reasonably 
related to a legitimate pedagogical concern. 
 
Z.H.'s kindergarten teacher accepted his poster as 
responsive to the assignment--that he depict something for 
which he was thankful. She placed it in the hall with the 
posters of his classmates. During the teacher's absence 
from school, Z.H.'s poster was taken down because of 
concern over its religious content. It was restored to the 
display, however, by his teacher on her return. Given the 
sensitivity of the issues raised by student religious 
expression, coupled with the notable immaturity of the 
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students involved and the relatively public display of the 
posters in the school hallway, the school's temporary 
removal of the poster does not violate the First Amendment 
rights of the student artist. As we have indicated, decisions 
on issues of this kind necessarily involve fact-sensitive 
exercises of discretion by school authorities and reservation 
of a brief period for deliberation is thus a measure 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. Cf. 
Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School, 98 F.3d 1530, 1541 
(7th Cir. 1996) (failure of school regulations to provide a 
definite time limit within which decisions to grant or deny 
permission to engage in expressive activity was reasonable); 
Salinas v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, 751 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 
1984) (delay occasioned by school board's deliberations over 
sensitive requests for use of facilities for expressive activity 
did not violate the requester's First Amendment rights).3 
 
IV. 
 
Plaintiff additionally asserts that defendants violated the 
Establishment Clause. The District Court analyzed this 
claim under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and 
found no violation. On appeal to this Court, plaintiff insists 
that by welcoming favorite stories, but excluding those that 
the teacher deemed "religious," defendants exhibited a 
"hostility toward religion" that is barred by the 
Establishment Clause. In addition, plaintiff argues that by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that the poster was removed 
"because of its religious theme." App. at 7. She further alleges that 
Z.H.'s 
teacher "properly returned the poster to the hallway, although this time 
the poster was placed at a less prominent location at the end of said 
hallway." Id. Plaintiff 's complaint does not, however, accuse Z.H.'s 
teacher of having placed the poster in a less prominent location because 
of its religious content. Nevertheless, plaintiff argues before us that 
the 
placement of the poster on its return constituted an independent 
violation of Z.H.'s First Amendment rights. We decline plaintiff 's 
invitation to require the District Court to review and regulate the 
school's 
placement of its students' artwork. Even if the sensitivity of the subject 
matter on Z.H.'s poster played some role in its placement, we believe that 
placement would be within the permissible discretion of Z.H.'s teacher 
for essentially the same reasons we have given in sustaining Ms. Oliva's 
exercise of her discretion. 
 
                                16 
  
involving the teacher in the determination as to which 
stories are too religious to be read to the class, the 
defendants' conduct "entangles government with religion, 
and departs from the neutrality toward religion that the 
Establishment Clause mandates." 
 
The plaintiff misconstrues the requirements of the 
Establishment Clause. To determine whether the 
defendants' conduct violated the Establishment Clause, we 
continue to apply the three-part test set out in Lemon. See 
ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of 
Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1483 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). Briefly 
stated, a government practice does not offend the 
Establishment Clause if (1) it has a secular purpose; (2) its 
principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits 
religion; and (3) it does not create an excessive 
entanglement of government with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. 
at 612-613. We agree with the District Court that this test 
is satisfied here. 
 
First, the defendants' purpose in restricting Z.H.'s 
reading to Ms. Oliva alone was, as discussed at length 
above, distinctly secular. Ms. Oliva chose to restrict Z.H.'s 
reading as a means to ensuring that no student mistakenly 
believe that Z.H.'s religious beliefs were officially sanctioned 
by the school. This concern for the possibility of confusion, 
as well as the possibility that Z.H.'s story might"upset" 
other students, was motivated by distinctly educational 
considerations. There is no suggestion to the contrary. 
Second, the one-time restriction Ms. Oliva imposed cannot 
be said to have had "the effect of communicating a message 
of government endorsement or disapproval of religion," 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984), let alone the 
"hostility toward religion" which plaintiff alleges. Ms. Oliva's 
restriction was an appropriate compromise, well-justified by 
her pedagogical concerns. Rather than require Z.H. to pick 
"another" favorite story, her compromise respected the 
integrity of his choice and permitted him to read his chosen 
tale in reward for his achievements. The accommodating 
approach Ms. Oliva took was thus far from hostile or 
disapproving. Finally, Ms. Oliva's conduct in this regard did 
little to entangle the government with religion. To the 
contrary, by implementing an alternative course that would 
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not entail her incorporation of his reading into that day's 
classwork, or her "approval" of Z.H.'s performance before 
the class, Ms. Oliva deftly avoided any appearance of 
entanglement that might have resulted. Compare Chandler, 
1999 WL 493495, at *8 ("Teacher participation in student- 
initiated prayer improperly entangles the State in religion 
and signals an unconstitutional endorsement of religion." 
(internal citation omitted)). 
 
As the Supreme Court has explained, "[a] proper respect 
for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses 
compels the State to pursue a course of `neutrality' toward 
religion, favoring neither one religion over others nor 
religious adherents collectively over nonadherents." Bd. of 
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 
687, 696 (1994) (internal citations omitted). We think 
defendants appropriately steered such a neutral course in 
this case. Thus we agree with the District Court that, even 
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
C.H. has failed to state a violation of the Establishment 
Clause. 
 
V. 
 
In sum, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to allege a 
violation of Z.H.'s First Amendment right to freedom of 
expression because the defendants' restrictions on Z.H.'s 
speech were reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical 
concern. In addition, we find no violation of the 
Establishment Clause. Finally, because we have found no 
constitutional violation, plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive 
relief. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court 
granting defendants' judgment on the pleadings under Rule 
12(c). 
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